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Gao Jingyi (高景逸)'s Understanding of Reverence (Jing 敬) and Its Transcendental Significance

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Abstract— *Gao Jing-yi (高景逸 Gao Pan-long 高攀龙, 1562–1626), a Zhu Xi (朱熹) scholar of the late Ming, inherited the Cheng–Zhu emphasis on "abiding in reverence" (zhu jing 主静) and reconsidered its meaning as a method of self-cultivation in the wake of Wang Yang-ming (王阳明)'s learning. This article first shows that Gao, following Zhu Xi's description of the mind as "the numinous essence of qi," classes the mind with qi while affirming that it is originally luminous and inherently able to know principle (li 理); this provides the theoretical basis for his account of reverence (jing 敬). The article then traces Gao's early struggle with "devoting effort solely to solemnity and self-restraint" and his later understanding of sincerity (cheng) as the original substance and reverence as the corresponding practice. It argues that for Gao reverence does not mean controlling the emotions through willpower; it is a practice of investigating things and exhausting principle that corresponds to the substance of sincerity and to human nature, and therefore encompasses all cultivation of the mind. Turning to reverence as a state of life, the article argues that the feelings of harmony and solemnity, of apprehension and caution, and of love and respect that Gao describes arise from the substance of human nature rather than from deliberate thought. They are possessed by everyone and known without learning, and so carry an a priori, originary significance, as a comparison with Kant's analysis of the feeling of respect helps to show. Finally, returning to Cheng Yi (程颐)'s analogy of the farmer who turns pale at the mention of a tiger, the article contends that, within a principle-centered account of mind and nature, the feeling of reverence is the manifestation of principle acting upon the mind, and that sustaining reverence and investigating things can strengthen the motivating force of moral feeling in practice.*

I. INTRODUCTION: THE PRACTICE OF HOLDING REVERENCE IN THE CHENG-ZHU LINEAGE

In traditional Song-Ming Confucianism, the lineage of the Learning of Principle (lixue 理学) represented by Cheng Yichuan (Cheng Yi 程颐, 1033–1107) and Zhu Xi (朱熹, 1130–1200) emphasized in its theory of self-cultivation chiefly practices such as exhausting principle (qiongli 穷理) and knowing nature (shixing 识性). Its focus generally revolved around how to grasp the principle inherent in our minds, attempting through practices such as the investigation of things (gewu 格物)

and clarifying principle (mingli 明理) to further expand the mind that knows principle, so that the moral principle originally inherent in the mind could be actualized in concrete life through practice. If expressed in Cheng Yichuan's terms, such a practice of investigating things and extending knowledge (gezhi 格知) is a process of cultivation enabling one to advance from "ordinary knowledge" (changzhi 常知) to "true knowledge" (zhenzhi 真知); in Zhu Xi's thought, it is the process described in the "Supplementary Commentary on the Investigation of Things" (Gewu buzhuang 《格物补传》) as "building on the principle already known and further exhausting it, seeking to reach its utmost."

For the above Cheng-Zhu practice of investigating things, academia has already had rich discussions, and there have also been many expositions of how Yichuan and Zhu Xi clarify principle and know nature. By comparison, another important issue also present in Cheng-Zhu cultivation theory—namely, attention to "maintaining reverence" (chijing 持敬)—has clearly received less research than investigating things and exhausting principle. If we examine Yichuan's and Zhu Xi's discussions of practice, we should be able to perceive that discourse on reverence is also an important juncture in the practical discourse of this Cheng-Zhu type of thought. For example, Yichuan has the statement "concentration on one is called reverence" [1], using this to explain the connection between the practice of the mind and maintaining reverence; with Zhu Xi it is stated even more clearly: "The Great Learning must enter through the investigation of things; it is best for the investigation of things to enter through reverence. With reverence alone, one can investigate things." [2] He also says: "Holding reverence and exhausting principle, though two ends, are in fact one root." [3] From the above words of the two masters, it can be seen that reverence in Yichuan's and Zhu Xi's thought is a concept in the theory of self-cultivation connecting our mind with the investigation of things and the exhaustion of principle, and is not merely emotionally numb sitting in a solemn posture with a restrained countenance [4]. In other words, in this thought system of Yichuan and Zhu Xi, the expressions maintaining reverence and holding reverence are deeply and closely related to the practical focus of clarifying principle and knowing nature; therefore, research on holding reverence will also help us understand Cheng-Zhu practice of investigating things.

Following the above, since the practice of holding reverence is a key characteristic of the Cheng-Zhu lineage, then how did Gao Jingyi (Gao Panlong 高攀龙, 1562–1626), who lived after Wang Yangming (Wang Shouren 王守仁, 1472–1529) and, together with Gu Jingyang (Gu Xiancheng 顾宪成, 1550–1612), revived the Donglin Academy and was committed to Zhu Xi's learning, [5] understand the practice of holding reverence as a successor of Zhu Xi's thought? This article will take the late-Ming Zhu Xi scholar Gao Jingyi as its object of analysis, in order to examine how, after the stimulus of Wang learning, late-Ming Zhu Xi followers reconstructed their thinking on the practice of holding reverence, and while trying to reveal how Jingyi made reverence a fundamental practice oriented toward clarifying principle and knowing nature, it will also thereby explore the connection between the discourse on reverence in Cheng-Zhu Learning of Principle and ontological theory.

II. JINGYI'S UNDERSTANDING OF THE MIND

The formulations of cultivation theory by Learning of Principle scholars are mostly related to their understanding of the ontology of mind and nature. Before proceeding to the analysis of Gao Jingyi's statements on reverence, a brief account should also be given of Jingyi's view of mind and nature. The following shows Jingyi's understanding of the mind:

> How are qi and mind to be distinguished? Between heaven and earth, what fills and pervades without gap is only qi. In heaven it is qi; in humans it is mind. The refined spirit of qi is mind; the filling and pervading of mind is qi. They are not two. [6]
>
> Yanwen asked, "How are mind and qi to be distinguished?" The Master said, "The filling and pervading of mind is qi; the refined spirit of qi is mind. For example, with the sun, what shines broadly is qi; what is condensed is mind; brightness is nature." [7]
>
> 气与心何以别之？天地间充塞无间者惟气而已，在天则为气，在人则为心，气之精灵为心，心之充塞为气，非有二也。[6]
>
> 彦文问："心与气何以分别？"先生曰："心之充塞为气，气之精灵为心，譬如日，广照者是气，凝聚者是心，明便是性。"[7]

Jingyi holds that although mind is qi, it is also the condensed and refined spirit of qi; because it is refined spirit, it can illuminate and manifest nature, and this is why it is "the refined spirit of qi." Jingyi's understanding of mind here clearly inherits a formulation from Zhu Xi that takes mind as "the intelligence of qi." In Zhu Xi's framework of mind and nature, although he maintains that the mind originally has knowledge of principle [8], under

the determination "the intelligence of qi" he assigns mind to qi, thereby distinguishing principle from mind; this also becomes the key point on which, in Zhu Xi's theory of moral accomplishment, human self-perfection and the practice of cultivation rest. Jingyi's account of mind through the refined spirit of qi carries the same implication; hence Jingyi also maintains that "the human mind cannot be given free rein" [9]. But since mind is "refined spirit," it cannot be regarded merely as qi. Here we need to mention another important point in Cheng, Zhu, and Jingyi's discourse on mind: in the Cheng-Zhu lineage, there is an affirmation that mind can illuminate and know principle. Jingyi grasps this point well. When discussing mind, he states:

> This mind is vast and boundless. Ordinary people are confined by form, limited by qi, bound by thoughts, and obscured by desires, and therefore cannot exhaust it. Exhausting the mind, one knows nature; knowing nature, one knows Heaven. Heaven is boundless, nature is boundless, mind is boundless—they are one only. [10]
>
> 此心广大无际，常人局于形，囿于气，缚于念，蔽于欲，故不能尽。尽心则知性，知性则知天。天无际，性无际，心无际，一而已矣。[10]

Jingyi holds that mind originally should be vast and boundless, but the minds of ordinary people are inevitably sometimes confined by form and qi, bound by desires and thoughts, and trapped and narrowed. Nevertheless, because this mind is the refined spirit of qi, it can still exhaust the mind and know nature. Since this mind can know nature and illuminate principle, it is said that mind, like nature and Heaven, pervades and is present in all things and events and is vast and boundless. To speak of the mind's vastness and boundlessness in terms of the mind that knows principle is clearly not to observe mind merely from the side of qi, but to observe it from the side of nature and Heaven. Hence Jingyi says: "If one does not illuminate the mind by Heaven, the mind cannot be made clear; if one does not illuminate Heaven by the mind, Heaven cannot be made clear." [11] Mind and nature are here linked very tightly, and this is also the main reason why Jingyi, although assigning mind to qi, can often affirm that "mind is principle" [12].

Following the above meaning and advancing one step further, we must affirm that the mind's knowing and illuminating principle is a priori and originally possessed. This is an important point in Zhu Xi's claim that mind knows principle, and such a view is likewise seen in Jingyi's discourse on mind. Jingyi says:

> What is luminous virtue? It is the human mind. The human mind is originally clear. Why then is there unclearness? The mind is originally clear, yet it also requires a person to make it clear himself. Therefore, when released outward it is unclear; when returned to the self it is clear. When attached to desire it is unclear; when following principle it is clear. When moved by qi it is unclear; when at peace in resting it is clear. When neglected in idleness it is unclear; when dwelling in reverence it is clear. When racing after activity it is unclear; when anchored in stillness it is clear. Its clarity and unclearness lie in the turn of a single thought, like turning over the palm—nothing difficult. [13]
>
> 明德者何也？人之心也，人心本明，有不明者何也？心本明又须人自明之，故放于外则不明，复于身则明；着于欲则不明，循于理则明；动于气则不明，安于止则明；荒于怠则不明，居于敬则明；骛于动则不明，主于静则明。其明与不明，在一念转移间，如反复掌，无难也。[13]

Jingyi speaks of mind in terms of luminous virtue, echoing Zhu Xi's statement: "Luminous virtue is what humans receive from Heaven; it is empty, spiritual, and not obscured, possessing all principles and responding to all affairs." [14] Jingyi also says that when this mind is released into desire it is unclear, and when it follows principle it is clear. Thus the clarity or unclearness of mind should be spoken of with respect to principle, and this can also explain the implication of Jingyi's claim that mind is "the refined spirit of qi." For the mind can be clear and spiritual with respect to principle, which manifests a possibility, as Jingyi understands it, that the mind can rely on principle rather than on qi. Therefore, the mind belonging to qi can still, in present choice, issue a resolve to act according to principle, rather than merely following the natural causal series and giving responses conforming to objects and conditions. Accordingly, to say that mind can be "clear" and "spiritual" cannot be based on the side of mind as belonging to qi; it must be because it knows principle that it has this manifestation of clarity and spirituality. In this sense, Jingyi's statement in the quotation that "the mind is originally clear" indicates that the human mind is naturally capable of being clear and penetrating with respect to principle; this is a root-level account. The "original" in "originally clear" is said with respect to the original relation between mind and principle, and is an account with a root-level meaning. Therefore, only in the above independent quotation can Jingyi maintain that the mind's illuminating principle is "in the turn of a single thought, like turning over the

palm—nothing difficult." If the knowledge of principle were not the self-illumination of its original clarity and the knowing of its original knowledge, but rather like the acquisition of acquired knowledge, necessarily depending on external circumstances and the accumulation of empirical operations, then Jingyi's claim "in the turn of a single thought, like turning over the palm—nothing difficult" could not hold.

III. JINGYI'S EXPLANATION OF REVERENCE

The foregoing has briefly described the basic views of Jingyi's theory of mind and nature, as well as his inheritance and development of Zhu Xi's thought on mind. We now return to the question of Jingyi's discourse on reverence. Just as Yichuan and Zhu Xi emphasized the practice of holding reverence, "reverence" is also an important concept in Jingyi's theory of practice. For example, he holds that "the thousand sages and ten thousand worthies are accomplished through the single word 'reverence'" [15], from which we can see how much he valued the practice of reverence. He also says:

> The beginning of learning requires knowing nature; the middle requires restoring nature; the end requires fully realizing nature—there is only one nature. Nature is known through reverence, nature is restored through reverence, nature is fully realized through reverence—there is only one reverence. [16]
>
> 学问起头要知性，中间要复性，了手要尽性，只一性而已；性以敬知，性以敬复，性以敬尽，只一敬而已。[16]

For Jingyi, the learning of moral accomplishment is the learning of nature. All practice consists only in examining and realizing our originally possessed nature, and in enabling people to proceed from knowing this nature to fully realizing it. This also reflects the basic stance of the Donglin school, which takes nature as its ultimate concern. What deserves our attention is that in this passage on the course of practice, Jingyi especially brings up the word "reverence," holding that reverence runs through the entire process of practice from knowing nature to restoring nature and fully realizing nature. This means that for Jingyi, "reverence" is a view connected with our entire individual moral practice and even with the elevation of the realm of life. This view of Jingyi's not only allows us to see his attention to "reverence," but also prompts us to ask further: if the focus of the practice of moral accomplishment lies in knowing nature and fully realizing nature, then, in light of Jingyi's theory of mind discussed above, would it not be enough for practice simply to know nature and exhaust principle? Why then establish a separate word "reverence" here? Why not speak directly of illuminating the mind and knowing nature—would that not be more fitting to the fundamentals of practice?

The above question actually concerns the relation between reverence and ontological theory in Jingyi's thought, as well as Jingyi's understanding of the root meaning of reverence. To grasp the answer to this question, we must still return to Jingyi's understanding of "reverence." Therefore, the following first turns to Jingyi's account of "reverence."

Jingyi's discussion of "reverence" can be roughly divided into two types: one speaks of reverence from the perspective of practice, and the other speaks of reverence from the perspective of the state of life. This section first observes Jingyi's understanding of reverence at the level of practice. He says: "Learning has infinite practice, and the single word 'mind' is the great summary of it; the mind has infinite practice, and the single word 'reverence' is the great summary of it." [15] Just as Zhu Xi, continuing Yichuan, said that "cultivating this mind requires reverence" [17], Jingyi also clearly points out that "reverence" is the summary of all practice on the mind. In fact, Jingyi himself tried the practice of maintaining reverence quite early. In Record of Learning through Hardship (Kunxue ji), he recounts that he began to aspire to the learning of the sages at the age of twenty-five. He describes himself as follows:

> I thought that what made the sages sages must lie in something they did. Not yet knowing the method, I read the Questions on the Great Learning (Daxue huowen) and saw Zhu Xi's statement that "nothing is more essential for entering the Way than reverence." Therefore I devoted myself exclusively to solemn respect and restraint, holding the mind within the square inch, but I only felt that my qi was blocked and my body constrained, greatly ill at ease; and when I let go, I became scattered as before, with nothing to be done. [18]
>
> 以为圣人所以为圣人者，必有做处。未知其方，看《大学或问》见朱子说"入道之要莫如敬"，故专用力于肃恭收敛，持心方寸间，但觉气郁身拘，大不自在，及放下，又散漫如故，无可奈何。[18]

Jingyi recalls that at that time he practiced Zhu Xi's teaching on reverence by "devoting effort to solemn respect and restraint, holding the mind within the square inch," but his feeling was: "I only felt that my qi was

blocked and my body constrained, greatly ill at ease; and when I let go, I became scattered as before…" Judging from this situation, Jingyi at this time probably applied the practice of holding reverence to the binding and maintaining of thoughts. However, merely focusing on controlling thoughts easily becomes a phenomenon of using emotion to stop emotion, which clearly offers little help for the cultivation of virtue. Moreover, Jingyi's understanding of "reverence" at this time was in fact not quite in accord with Zhu Xi. Although Zhu Xi's discussion of "reverence" does include the statement that "when the human mind's spirit flies about and the mind is not inside its shell, it harms matters" [19], if one wishes to make this mind constantly present, one should settle the mind by means of principle. Hence Zhu Xi says: "When reverence is present, heavenly principle is constantly clear, and human desires naturally are checked, blocked, dissolved, and cured." [20] Compared with Zhu Xi's statement, it is evident that Jingyi at this time had not yet appreciated that Zhu Xi's discussion of "reverence" was mainly grasped in terms of the relation between mind and principle.

The reason Jingyi's early appropriation of the practice of reverence was understood through "devoting effort exclusively to solemn respect and restraint, holding the mind within the square inch" may also be related to the fact that Zhu Xi sometimes discussed reverence as "restraint without self-indulgence" [21]. The young Jingyi may have been fixated precisely on this, and thus inevitably intended to use the practice of maintaining reverence to restrain this mind. Later Jingyi himself also reflected: "The mind cannot be settled by force; the more one tries to settle it, the more it cannot be settled. Only by resting in affairs does it settle itself—this is what is meant by letting each thing receive its own due." [11] Jingyi points out that the only way to settle this refined spiritual mind is to let each thing receive its own due and each return to its own principle. If the practice of maintaining reverence is to reach this point, it cannot be a matter of using emotion to stop emotion. Clearly, as in Zhu Xi's statement in the previous passage, one must, within the practice of maintaining reverence, cultivate our mind and personally embody the principle originally possessed by oneself, and thereby settle and calm the mind through reverence. Therefore, when Jingyi later analyzes Yichuan's statement "concentration on one is called reverence," he says:

> Master Cheng said: "Concentration on one is called reverence." The one is called sincerity; "concentration" means that intention is present therein. Sincerity is substance; reverence is practice. If one does not know sincerity, one does not know reverence; if one does not know reverence, one does not know sincerity. [9]
>
> 程子曰："主一者谓之敬。"一者，谓之诚，主则有意在是。诚者，本体也；敬者，工夫也。不识诚，亦不识敬；不识敬，亦不识诚。[9]

In Jingyi's discussion above, the practice of reverence first corresponds clearly not to the sensory effects given by temperament and intention, but to one's own substance of sincerity. To speak of reverence in this way, so that one can concentrate on one and know sincerity, shows that "reverence" is also a virtue-practice corresponding to the substance of sincerity and to ontological substance. This is clearly different from Jingyi's earlier understanding of reverence described above. Maintaining and preserving reverence in this way so as to know sincerity is like the practice of investigating things, exhausting principle, and knowing nature. This is the main meaning of Jingyi's earlier statement that "nature is known through reverence." Precisely for this reason, the practice of reverence can have substantive significance in improving and transforming moral life, rather than relying entirely on the excitement of a momentary temperamental life to block the human feelings and private desires that arise and perish ten thousand times.

Following the above meaning, Jingyi points out:

> Only sincerity and reverence are both practice and substance. Sincerity is without action; reverence is without partial attachment. Through them one recognizes substance, and therefore one never expends the slightest effort. [22]
>
> 惟诚敬即工夫即本体，诚无为，敬无适，以识本体，故未尝费纤毫之力也。[22]

If one can maintain oneself with sincerity and reverence, then one's daily life and one's conduct in handling affairs and responding to things should simply be the natural manifestation of substance. In other words, it is to return things according to their own principles. Therefore it is said that there can be no interference from private intention, and that one "never expends the slightest effort" therein. He once encouraged scholars with this meaning, and gave the following response to people of his time who either regarded reverence as an acquired practice, or held that holding reverence hindered the seeing of nature, and used this as an excuse for not being willing to undertake the actual practice of maintaining reverence:

> Those who discuss learning today are mostly confused with Chan learning, and so they say that one need only recognize this self; since it is originally self-cultivated,

why add another cultivation? Since it is originally self-reverent, why add another reverence? It instead becomes an obstacle… People today also mostly misunderstand this word "reverence," saying that as soon as reverence is mentioned, one becomes fixated on reverence—but this is precisely not reverence. Whenever people's minds are tangled and disturbed, it is only because they are not reverent. If they were reverent, they would suddenly be free of trouble. How could there be a principle that reverence becomes an obstacle by placing reverence in the breast? Nowadays in the great assembly, everyone is harmonious and solemn, and their minds are clean and pure—this is the appearance of cultivating oneself with reverence. Being like this for a moment makes one a gentleman for a moment; being like this for a day makes one a gentleman for a day. [23]

今之谈学者多混禅学，便说只要认得这个已，他原自修的何须更添个修，原自敬的何须更添个敬，反成障碍了。……今人又多错认了这个敬字，谓才说敬，便着在敬上了，此正不是敬。凡人心下胶胶扰扰，只缘不敬，若敬便豁然无事了，岂有敬而着个敬在胸中为障碍之理。如今大会中，大家雍雍肃肃，心下洁洁净净便是修己以敬的样子，一刻如此便做了一刻君子，一日如此便做了一日君子。[23]

Scholars at that time who opposed cultivating oneself through reverence either thought that reverence was an acquired practice added to oneself from outside, or held that maintaining reverence in cultivation was merely fixating on reverence and actually an obstacle to recognizing oneself. Jingyi retorts that the reason the mind feels tangled and disturbed is precisely that the mind is not reverent. If one truly understood reverence, then, as described above, everything would issue from the principle in the mind: affirming what is right, denying what is wrong, acting when one should act, stopping when one should stop. Originally there should not be emotional expressions of confusion, unease, constraint, and tension. This is what Jingyi means by "having no affair in the mind is called reverence." [15] The state of life in maintaining reverence and cultivation should originally be clean, orderly, and thoroughly free of any affair. Therefore, in the passage quoted above, Jingyi also draws on the Book of Songs—"Harmonious in the palace, solemn at court"—to illuminate the harmonious and respectful life-bearing atmosphere of the gentleman after cultivating himself with reverence. What Jingyi says here can be regarded as a shift from speaking of reverence as practice on the mind to speaking of reverence as the realm or state of life.

IV. JINGYI'S UNDERSTANDING AND EXPLANATION OF THE ROOT MEANING OF REVERENCE

When reverence is spoken of from the perspective of practice, the practice of reverence corresponds to the mind and together belongs to the single matter of the practice of investigating things and exhausting principle; therefore it can be regarded by Jingyi as the great summary of practices on the mind. If, however, reverence is spoken of from the perspective of the realm [of life], then the distinctive features of "reverence" become visible in another way, along with its a priori root meaning and the theoretical basis on which it can be established. Jingyi says:

Zhu Xi said: "One should take what has already issued and thereby illuminate it." This is the doctrine of the four sprouts, the method of Mencius. I, however, say: "One should also take what has not yet issued and thereby illuminate it." This is the doctrine of the great root, the method of the Doctrine of the Mean. How is it that one takes what has not yet issued? When the various worthies ascend the Hall of Highest Good, is there anyone who is not harmonious and solemn? At this time of harmony and solemnity, is there joy? Anger? Sorrow or happiness? Or are there thoughts and deliberations? There are none. This is what is called the unissued; it is the substance of goodness. One turn of reflective observation and it becomes clear. What is it that does this reflective observation? It is the mind, luminous virtue. Nature is quiescent and still, and the mind can observe it; feelings issue and move, and the mind can regulate them. This is why the mind governs nature and feeling, and why luminous virtue has substance and function in the highest good. This is the method of investigation and extension. [24]

朱子曰：当因其所发而遂明之。此四端之说也，孟子之法也。吾则曰：又当因其所未发而遂明之。此大本之说也，中庸之法也。何以因其未发也？诸贤之登至善堂也，有不雍雍肃肃者乎？此雍雍肃肃之时，有喜乎？怒乎？哀乐乎？抑有思虑乎？无有也，所谓未发也，善之体也。一反观而明矣。此反观者何物也？心也，明德也。性寂而静，心能观之；情发而动，心能节之。此心之所以统乎性情，而明德之所以体用乎至善也，格致之法也。[24]

The earlier quotation says that if a gentleman can cultivate himself with reverence, then his mind will be calm and unconstrained, and the vital atmosphere of life

manifested will naturally be harmonious and solemn, a state of harmony and respectful gravity. Here Jingyi distinguishes the feeling of harmony and solemnity from the feelings of joy, anger, sorrow, and happiness, holding that the former is unissued and differs from the latter, which are already issued. Yet why can a bearing of harmony and solemn dignity be regarded as one aspect of the unissued? According to Jingyi's account, what is unissued is the substance of goodness, the nature that is quiescent and still; goodness and nature are originally inherent in the mind, and this is the basis on which reverence relies to cultivate our mind. Therefore the reverence of the mind means that our mind can be upright in relation to nature; and to say that the mind can manifest as a feeling of respectful gravity is also because the substance of goodness can manifest its emotional function through the mind. Thus Jingyi's taking the feeling of reverence as unissued, unlike the four feelings of joy, anger, sorrow, and happiness, must be because in his understanding the feeling of harmony and solemnity originates from good nature and not from thoughts and deliberations; this feeling arises from substance and is not dragged along by external things.

The meaning of Jingyi's distinction above can also be seen in the following passage:

> Your letter says: "Inwardly maintain caution and fear; outwardly keep to the compass and square, the plumb line and level." These two sayings should be practiced for a lifetime. It also says: "Caution and fear are the true spirit of the substance of nature; the compass and square, the plumb line and level are the true order of the substance of nature." This is a saying that penetrates nature. People who do not yet know nature regard these as shackles; only when one penetrates nature does one know that this is true peace and joy. For the mean that is naturally and inherently possessed is utterly without artificial arrangement or fabrication. Without exhaustive investigation one does not awaken; without awakening one does not penetrate. If the substance of nature is not penetrated, no one can know that the norms of our sage are naturally born and natural. How then should we wonder that they wish to sweep away these norms? The learning of the sage differs from that of the Buddhists only in exhausting principle. If one exhausts principle, then nature is the nature of the sage; if one does not exhaust principle, then nature is the nature of the Buddhists. How could nature have two [versions]? It is only that the point from which one enters differs. [25]
>
> 手教云"内存戒慎恐惧，外守规矩准绳"两语，当终身行之。又云"戒慎恐惧是性体真精神，规矩准绳是性体真条理"，此透性语也。人未知性，谓此为桎梏，若透性方知此是真安乐。盖天然自有之中，绝无安排造作者也，非穷参不悟，非悟不彻。性体不彻，未有知吾圣人之矩，为天生自然者，又何怪其欲扫除此矩哉？圣人之学所以异于释氏者，穷理而已。穷理，则性为圣人之性；不穷理，则性为释氏之性。性岂有二哉？所从入之端殊也。[25]

Here he holds that caution and fear are probably the true spirit issuing from the substance of nature, and that only one who truly penetrates the substance of virtue can have this feeling. Although Jingyi does not directly mention the word "reverence" in the quoted passage, the description of inwardly maintaining caution and fear and outwardly keeping norms is very close to the earlier meaning of maintaining reverence as harmonious, solemn, neat, and pure, and should serve as supplementary explanation to the preceding text. What deserves attention in the passage is Jingyi's statement that "people who do not yet know nature regard these as shackles; only when one penetrates nature does one know that this is true peace and joy." This clearly shows that the reverent feeling of caution and fear does not exist only in the person of the virtuous gentleman; it is constant and always present in every person. This highlights that this feeling of caution and fear has a universality that follows from transcendent nature-principle. The difference is that some people regard such a feeling as shackles, while others regard it as true peace and joy. The difference in these two feelings does not lie in the presence or absence of the feeling of reverence, but only in whether or not one exhausts principle. If one can truly exhaust principle and penetrate nature, then one can truly take this feeling of reverence as peace and joy; otherwise one regards this feeling as constraint and limitation. Yet this kind of feeling, originating from original nature, is possessed by everyone, is known without waiting for learning, and is constantly present in the mind.

Jingyi also once used Mencius's "innate good knowing" and "innate good capacity" to explicate this meaning. He says:

> Mencius said: "The gentleman preserves benevolence in his mind and preserves propriety in his mind. The benevolent love others; the propriety-observing respect others." The gentleman's preserving the mind is only benevolence and propriety; benevolence and propriety are only love and respect. Therefore, in

> hoping to reach the sages who are models for the present and transmitted to later ages, it is these two alone. Where do these two come from? They come from childhood. Children know love; when slightly older they know respect. No one knows why it is so, and this is why they are called innate good knowing and innate good capacity; they are the original mind of humans. [26]

> 孟子曰：“君子以仁存心，以礼存心。仁者爱人，有礼者敬人。”君子存心只是仁礼，仁礼只是爱敬，所以期至于法今传后之圣人，斯二者而已矣。斯二者何从来也，从孩提来也，孩提知爱，稍长知敬，莫知其所以然而然，所以为良知、良能，是人之本心也。[26]

The scholars quoted earlier who opposed Jingyi's discourse on reverence either thought that as soon as reverence is mentioned it is an acquired practice, an obstacle added to oneself from outside. But in Jingyi's view, this feeling of love and respect is originally the feeling closest to our original nature. He even holds that such a feeling connected with morality is exactly like what Mencius called innate good knowing and innate good capacity. It "comes from childhood," is possessed from birth, and is a natural feeling that does not wait for later empirical learning. Therefore Jingyi says that this feeling of love and respect is originally something whose why-it-is-so no one knows.

Through the discussion of the preceding quotations, we can probably indicate the root meaning and why-it-is-so of the kind of moral feeling connected with original nature that Jingyi refers to. In these several passages concerning the feeling of "reverence" in the realm of our life, Jingyi attempts to point out that such a feeling connected with morality actually has an a priori characteristic. Therefore he says that, examined empirically, it is something whose why-it-is-so is unknown; yet both those who do not know nature and those who know nature can be moved by it (one group feels it as shackles, the other feels it as true peace and joy). This suffices to show that this feeling is "naturally inherent" in everyone. This kind of statement by Jingyi about the moral feeling of reverence easily invites associations with the form of the original mind. After all, in the main-principle type of thought that assigns mind to qi, feelings all issue from the qi of the mind. How then can we find here a moral feeling with an a priori attribute, and thereby find a foothold for this theory of reverence? Observing Gao Jingyi's earlier statements on reverence from the perspective of practice, Jingyi holds that reverence and the investigation of things and exhausting principle originally belong to the same matter. This is because reverence, like the investigation of things, is a practice given in correspondence to the nature of the mind and the principle of things. Thus the object of reverence is the great root, nature, and universal moral principle. In other words, maintaining reverence and cultivation is a kind of realization corresponding to moral substance. If this realization is expressed in the spiritual state reached in life, it is the various emotional responses of caution and fear, harmony and solemnity, and even peace and joy that Jingyi describes. In this sense, such a feeling, originating as it does in connection with moral practice, is a moral feeling arising from original nature; and because this feeling of reverence is caused by nature-principle and is the effect of nature-principle directly acting upon feeling, in Jingyi's own words it is the spiritual feeling of original nature acting upon itself in a way whose why-it-is-so no one knows. Therefore this spiritual feeling is an action or manifestation of the transcendent substance upon actual feeling. Although we cannot directly take feeling as nature, such moral feeling can indeed be regarded as a verification of our nature-principle manifesting in the mind, and as a profile of the mind's original knowledge of principle.

Jingyi's description of this feeling arising from nature-principle is quite close and comparable to what the Western philosopher Kant calls moral feeling. Kant's statement is quoted below to clarify Jingyi's account. Kant says:

> The pure moral law, presented by practical reason apart from all interest and presented for our observance—the voice of this moral law even makes the most daring criminal tremble with terror and forces him to hide himself and not dare to look it in the face. In unlimited obedience to such a moral law, there is something so singular that we cannot be astonished that we see "the influence of a merely intellectual idea upon feeling," an influence that is entirely incomprehensible on the side of speculative reason, nor can we be astonished that we must be satisfied with cognizing a priori that this influence is so great that such a feeling is inseparably connected with the concept of the moral law in every finite rational being. [27]

Kant holds that respect, as a manifestation of human feeling, has a source different from ordinary human feelings. Ordinary emotional responses mostly originate in external objects: whether one feels at ease because sensual desire is satisfied, or feels resentment because conditions of existence are deprived, these emotional feelings are all caused by various relative responses arising when the individual faces external circumstances. In other words, these feelings of joy or worry are all

aroused by our contact with external things; the emergence of this series of different feelings is a corresponding result falling under the natural causal series. However, Kant holds that the occurrence of the feeling of respect alone is different from the emotional feedback produced when the subject faces external circumstances. Kant says: "Respect for the moral law is the sole and unquestionable moral incentive, and this feeling of respect, except as based on the moral law, is directed to no object (being)." [28] In other words, as a moral feeling, the appearance of the feeling of respect is not directly connected with any external circumstance, but is directed solely to the universal moral law in people's minds. It is because the law, by its purity sufficient to determine the will and by its sublimity that limits all conditioned inclinations, produces such a practical feeling. Therefore such a feeling can be given only when facing the moral law. Any force that tries to obstruct or diminish it will only further promote this activity and response. And because its origin is connected with the reason of every practical agent, it must be a practical feeling, and it is "known a priori" [29], and is "in every finite rational being."

Through the comparison with Kant's account, we can better see why Gao Jingyi says that the feeling of love and respect has an a priori character comparable to innate good knowing and innate good capacity, and why the spirit of caution and fear originating from original nature can be affirmed as a universal moral feeling present in everyone. Briefly, because such a moral feeling is a feeling given in correspondence to nature-principle, it necessarily has a special character different from ordinary emotional responses. The so-called "special character" indicates that although such a feeling, in terms of its nature as feeling, still belongs to experience, yet if we consider its origin in the subject's positive affirmation of the moral law, then such a feeling of reverence is after all the result of the moral law directly acting on the subject. Therefore it has a generative principle different from ordinary empirical feelings that depend on external things; and insofar as this principle corresponds to transcendent nature-principle, it endows our feeling of reverence with universality and apriority. Ordinary emotional responses arising from external things may lack the guarantee of necessity and universality because external things change and individuals differ. But nature-principle is originally universally the same, and moral feeling arising from nature-principle has the guarantee of necessary existence. We may perhaps see in actual situations that some people are more easily filled with righteous indignation by unjust deeds, while others remain indifferent to them. But this only means that the moral sense of the former is stronger and that of the latter weaker, even so weak as to be imperceptible to others. Strength and weakness can only be differences in intensity; even if it is so weak as to be imperceptible to others, this is not sufficient to deny the existence of this moral feeling.

V. CONCLUSION : THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE FEELING OF REVERENCE UNDER THE PRINCIPLE-CENTERED MODEL OF MIND-NATURE THEORY

The foregoing has attempted, through an analysis of Jingyi's writings on reverence and through comparison with Kant's view, to offer a possible direction for understanding the account of the feeling of respect given under the framework of mind-nature theory built on the principle-centered model, as well as its root meaning. Finally, this article attempts to bring Jingyi's account of this feeling of respect into connection with Yichuan's parable of turning pale at the mention of a tiger [30], in order to make clear the significance of the feeling of reverence in moral practice under this form of thought. In Yichuan's parable of turning pale at the mention of a tiger, in order to solve the problem of why ordinary people know goodness yet cannot do goodness, he offers an explanation through the distinction between "ordinary knowledge" and "true knowledge." Observing Yichuan's parable, he holds that ordinary people all know that a tiger can injure people, and the difference lies in the farmer who has actually been injured by a tiger and therefore "truly knows" the tiger; Yichuan says that only his "countenance changes differently from others." Thus the difference between true knowledge and ordinary knowledge lies presumably in the fact that true knowledge can elicit a real response or manifestation. Such a response, sufficient to generate practical motivation, necessarily occurs in the one who truly knows principle, whereas the other is insufficient. Therefore, the distinction between ordinary knowledge and true knowledge should be understood not so much as whether there is an essential difference in the knowledge that knows principle, but rather as a question of the intensity of practical motivation. Through Jingyi's view of the feeling of reverence, we can understand that the more we realize and inwardly examine the nature-principle inherent in ourselves, the more this nature-principle will produce an effect in the mind and elicit a moral feeling that is a priori and universal. In this way, if one can have a genuine understanding of the principle of our mind, then one will naturally have an irrepressible expression, just like the farmer in the parable who speaks of the tiger. This

can also explain for us why scholars of the principle-centered model, even though the mind originally knows principle, still need to engage in the practice of investigating things in order to know nature and clarify principle. For in such a process, the intensity of the moral feeling aroused by the moral law acting upon the individual will is at the same time elevated. This is not only a manifestation of nature-principle as originally inherent in the mind, but also the practical process in which thinkers of the principle-centered model attempt, through the practice of holding reverence, to actively promote the continuous deepening of nature-principle in the mind.

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